Abstraction by Set-Membership: Verifying Security Protocols and Web Services with Databases

The abstraction and over-approximation of protocols and web services by a set of Horn clauses is a very successful method in practice. It has however limitations for protocols and web services that are based on databases of keys, contracts, or even access rights, where revocation is possible, so that the set of true facts does not monotonically grow with the transitions. We extend the scope of these over-approximation methods by defining a new way of abstraction that handle such databases, and we formally prove that the abstraction is sound. We realize a translator from a convenient specification language to standard Horn clauses and use the verifier ProVerif and the theorem prover SPASS to solve them. We show by a number of examples that this approach is practically feasible for a wide variety of verification problems of security protocols and web services.
Keyword: Modersheim, Mödersheim
The author can be contacted at: samo@imm.dtu.dk

By: Sebastian Moedersheim

Published in: Proc. 17th ACM Conf. on Computer and Communications Security "CCS 2010," Chicago, IL , ACM, p.351-360 in 2010

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